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he All-Volunteer Force (AVF) of the United States of America started as a measure to both 
appease the public and conserve the structure and integrity of the military. As stated in 
“Reassessing the All-Volunteer Force” by Karl Eikenberry, President Nixon was in part 
elected because he promised an angry youth that he would end the draft that had dragged so many of 
them to the rice paddies of Vietnam and led thousands of these unwilling participants to their deaths. 
The country was scrambling to hold itself together after Vietnam created or inflamed tensions at 
every level of society. Therefore in the early 1970s, the AVF was suggested by the president and 
unanimously supported by its Advisory Commission, and was hailed as a step towards a better future 
(Eikenberry 9). The public, the government, and the military were equally pleased with their deal. 
They could not foresee how the AVF would erode the foundations of everything they held dear. 
As a result of the AVF, apathy would spread over the country like a fog and politicians would 
run loose, pulling the military into conflict after conflict while the public shrugged its shoulders and 
looked away. The military would lose the very integrity it was fighting for in 1973 when the AVF 
was implemented because they would no longer answer to the public. The circle of military insiders 
would shrink and shrink until they policed themselves and turned against anyone from the outside 
trying to look in. The volunteer military of the United States has been proven to be disastrous for the 
country, its values, and its people because of civilian disinterest in modern wars, the lack of public 
pressure on the government, and the lack of accountability within the military. 
The United States was founded on the principle of a citizen-soldier. There would be no 
standing army of a ruling king because the military would assemble from the very citizens 
themselves when called upon to defend their land. This would insure that the ruling power could not 
send his mercenaries to fight any battle he desired, but would have to appeal to the public to put 
down their shovels and pick up arms. In a 2009 speech to West Point students, William Deresiewicz 
quoted Colonel Scott Krawczyk speaking on this subject and saying “From the very earliest days of 
this country, the model for our officers, which was built on the model of the citizenry and reflective 
of democratic ideals, was to be different. They were to be possessed of a democratic spirit marked by 
independent judgment, the freedom to measure action and to express disagreement, and the crucial 
responsibility never to tolerate tyranny” (Krawczyk qtd. in Deresiewicz 5). 
This is but one of the many enlightened ideals that flourished in the new country of 
revolutionaries and it was soundly dismantled by the introduction of the AVF in 1973. Due to anger, 
distrust, and sometimes outright hatred of the military, the public disengaged as soon as they knew 
they would not be drafted. Today, the vast majority of people never even consider military service 
for their country. According to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, which published 
“Conscription Threatens Hard-Won Achievements and Military Readiness,” this is actually a positive 
aspect of the AVF. They assert that “During the most recent draft, 90 percent of conscripts quit after 
their initial two-year hitch, whereas retention of volunteers is five-times better—about half remain 
after their initial (normally four-year) military service obligation” (1). While the government may 
view this positively, it means that the military and the “people” of the United States are by and large 
no longer the same group. The high retention rate of the AVF is beneficial from a financial point of 
view but the result is that foundational values of America have been lost. There is now a standing 
army and it does not rely on the average citizen to take up arms in times of war. The citizen-soldier 
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no longer exists and the model for US military officers, as explained by Colonel Krawczyk, has been 
lost to the apathy and anger of the American people. 
Andrew J. Bacevich harshly criticizes the American public for allowing this divide to take 
place in Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their Country, stating that 
“Except as spectators, Americans abrogated any further responsibility for war in all of its aspects. 
With the people opting out, war became the exclusive province of that state. Washington could do 
what it wanted—and it did (Bacevich 13). However, the blame cannot be placed solely at the public’s 
feet. Most people will not willingly sign their autonomy over to the whims of a vast institution like 
the government unless they believe they will be treated fairly and in the sincerity of that institution. 
The last conscripted American war, Vietnam—coupled with the perfect storm of racial tension, fear 
of nuclear war, unemployment, and general political clumsiness—led to widespread disdain and 
distrust for the government. 
What many saw as a flagrant misuse of America’s citizens and military might created a toxic 
relationship between the public and the politicians. As noted by Bacevich, “Senior military and 
civilian officials who managed World War II had viewed public support for the war effort as both 
critical and finite, an essential asset to be carefully nurtured and no less carefully expended. 
Throughout the war years, concern that citizens might balk at marching orders not to their liking 
remained omnipresent” (Bacevich 31). A democracy at war is at the mercy of its people’s will and 
willingness and Vietnam did not respect this delicate balance like World War II did. Therefore, it 
cannot be surprising nor indefensible of the public to turn away from signing their lives away to a 
system in which they did not believe. The necessary trust of the public had been stressed and strained 
so far that some argued it was broken completely. 
If not broken, the trust between the American people and the American government was at 
least deeply flawed. It would have taken years and years to return to the golden age of the 40s and 
50s when the government enjoyed widespread support from the people in the wake of World War II. 
After the disastrous Vietnam War, walking the line to regain public support was deemed too high a 
price to pay and too difficult to achieve consistently. Instead, the United States government neatly 
sidestepped the issue altogether by simply removing the issue from everyone’s minds. Conscription 
was gone and in return, the public would generally support the government’s military actions. The 
lukewarm but consistent public support would allow the government to make all the decisions it 
wished without consequence. Former Army general and ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl 
Eikenberry, laments this lack of accountability in “Reassessing the All-Volunteer Force,” published 
in the Washington Quarterly, worrying that: 
 
Under the AVF model, Congress has even fewer incentives to assert its constitutional 
responsibilities over the executive branch. Without sizeable numbers of organized 
constituents fretting about the personal and family costs of a conflict, a legislator has 
incentive to discount the future and avoid casting a vote against waging war during 
the flag-waving stage of a crisis. Most members of Congress, always with an eye on 
reelection, will hesitate before contesting strong executive appeals to commit forces 
abroad in the stated defense of the national interest. By such abdication of 
responsibility, Congress is failing to serve as the check on executive power 
envisioned by the drafters of the Constitution (Eikenberry 13-14). 
 
 Without public pressure, Congress does not need to worry about long-term plans or 
ramifications. They bend and fold with whatever current hysteria is popular in order to be reelected 
and avoid scrutiny about the validity of their choices. By doing this, they shirk their duties to the 
United States and the American people and it is made possible for them to do so because of the AVF. 
The values they are supposed to uphold have been eaten away by their own spinelessness and by a 
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dispassionate society. Congress no longer proudly serves the American public interest because there 
is no more American public interest—at least not towards wars. The people do not hold politicians to 
a higher standard because they feel no personal connection to the military or the soldiers who fight 
on their behalf. There is an omnipresent admiration for the military forces in American society but no 
feeling of personal stake in their successes or failures. 
Americans are indoctrinated from a young age to have an ironclad respect for the military. 
Though at first glance, this may seem as though it is positive, it is actually highly detrimental to the 
continuing progress of the United States. The respect instilled in the breast of every American does 
not come from a deep reverence and understanding of our military’s history nor the values for which 
it stands. Instead, it is a tradeoff. It comes from an understanding that by respecting the military, one 
has paid one’s dues and can no longer be asked to perform the duties of a citizen-soldier. Blind faith 
and loyalty has absolved the American people of their responsibility for understanding the conflicts 
the US enters and the consequences these conflicts will have. Without the ability to criticize, 
something that is handily taken away when unending loyalty is taught from birth and critics are 
brandished as traitors, the public has lost its finger on the pulse of the military. It is now a separate 
beast, utterly alien and isolated from the vast majority of Americans. 
This has allowed the military to turn into a “private club” of sorts where it is more important 
to save face than to admit to wrongdoing within the ranks. In “Prayer in the Furnace,” a short story in 
Redeployment by Phil Klay, this is shown when the Chaplain has it hinted to him by Lance Corporal 
Rodriguez that his company had violated the Rules of Engagement (ROE) in Iraq. The Chaplain 
attempts to bring this concern to higher positions of authority for an investigation and is denied 
repeatedly. Major Ekland, a man who previously had been friendly towards the Chaplain turns 
hostile, arguing that “Weak, strong, it doesn’t matter. You think Lieutenant Colonel Fehr will ever 
become Colonel Fehr if he tells higher, ‘Hey, we think we did some war crimes’?” (Klay 144). Major 
Ekland’s response shows that under the AVF, the military focus is on reputation rather than virtuous 
and successful work. This is only possible because Americans are no longer intimately involved in 
the war process. They do not examine military actions too closely because that is the bargain they 
struck when the AVF was implemented. 
This has led to what Thomas Ricks calls a “General Failure.” In his article by the same name, 
Ricks explains that Americans may have been sluggishly criticizing the Bush administration for its 
sloppy leadership during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars but have not yet begun pointing fingers at the 
higher military ranks. This does not stem from a valiant military leadership that is wholly without 
reprove, but from an ignorance of how terribly the generals have dealt with the wars. Again, this is 
possible because of the AVF. Without a widespread public involvement in the wars, there is no 
widespread public interest or awareness in the military leadership in the wars. This has had much of 
the same effect on the military as it had on Congress. Lack of accountability from the people has 
allowed the military to grow stagnant. As Ricks put it, “Ironically, our generals have grown worse as 
they have been lionized more and more by a society now reflexively deferential to the military. 
Relief of generals has become so rare that a private who loses his rifle is now punished more than a 
general who loses his part of the war” (Ricks 2). The country has now been embroiled in war for 
longer than ever before, yet because of the AVF there has been no backlash. 
The seemingly obvious answer to the failure of the AVF would be to reinstate the draft. 
However, this kneejerk reaction would cause more problems than it would solve. The American 
public would be understandably hostile towards anyone who suggested reinstating the draft, 
especially in the midst of several unpopular conflicts and with a new generation of angry, 
disenfranchised youths inhospitable to either the government, the military, or both coming of age. A 
more subtle, sensitive change is required. First and foremost, the social curriculum has to change. 
Criticism of time-honored institutions has to be not only allowed but encouraged and seen as vital to 
the progression of the American culture. This will begin to reconnect the public to the military, 
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particularly when the military responds to those accusations earnestly. 
Apathy is bred when one believes he or she cannot change anything. To criticize that apathy 
and refuse to address the root of the cause for it in the first place is unjustifiable. The next step should 
be to begin compulsory service to the state. It ought to be a part of having citizenship and in the years 
before it becomes fully obligatory, the government could sweeten the deal by offering incentives to 
those volunteering to start their service early. This would soothe some of the anger from the current 
generation and ease the transition into service. The key part of this service is that it should come with 
several options. Military service would be an option of course, but opting to fix roads or help the 
needy should also be equally viable. 
This would strength the bond of the average citizen and the country, and reignite the spirit of 
the “citizen-soldier” on which the US was founded. The “citizen-engineers” or “citizen-teachers” 
would help the country in an equally positive way while allowing a citizen to retain their autonomy 
and their right to protest war actions. This would serve as a finger on the pulse of the American 
people, if they largely disagreed with the war at hand or the military’s policies, there would be a 
large number of people opted into nonmilitary service. This would force the military and government 
to take notice of the people’s desires while forcing the people to be more aware of what their country 
is doing in their name. Successful change typically comes from several angles and with no small 
amount of protests and this would be no exception. There is no argument, however, that the United 
States of America will prosper if the current method of AVF continues to corrode the American 
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